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This study analyzes the effect of the presence of Wal-Mart Supercenters on the prices at 
conventional supermarkets in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. Using price 
indexes constructed from primary price data on a basket of 54 goods and holding several 
demographics and market conditions constant, we determine that Supercenters result in a 
7.79% average price reduction in national brand goods and a 6.38% average price 
reduction in private label goods. Wal-Mart Supercenters also price their groceries on 
average 15.65% lower than supermarkets competing with Supercenters and 22.28% lower 
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I. Introduction 
 
The discount retailer Wal-Mart has been a popular topic for discussion and debate for 
more than a decade. Its meteoric rise in the department store industry is well documented. 
In early 1981, Wal-Mart’s sales constituted less than 12% of Sears’, then the largest 
retailer in the United States. Less than ten years later, Wal-Mart officially became the 
largest retailer in the country (Vance and Scott, 1994). By 1997, Wal-Mart was the single 
largest employer with over 680,000 associates. Wal-Mart has grown so large that 
lawmakers take Wal-Mart into consideration when labor regulations and reforms are 
brought before Congress (Strope, 2004). 
In 2003, Wal-Mart also became the largest food retailer in the United States (Jones, 
2004) and is currently the leading grocer worldwide (Progressive Grocer, 2005). The 
company achieved this position in the United States largely due to the rapid expansion of 
Supercenters over the past decade. Supercenters are Wal-Mart stores that offer entire 
lines of groceries in addition to all of the usual wares found at conventional Wal-Mart 
locations. Supercenters are spreading across the nation quickly with 1,376 outlets 
recorded in 2003 and a projection for 1,000 more by 2008 (Business Week, 2003).  
Supercenters are the subjects of as much, if not more, controversy than conventional 
Wal-Mart stores. For example, in 2003 Wal-Mart proposed the construction of a dozen 
Supercenters throughout the entire state of California by the end of 2007. Citing low 
wages and inadequate health care for employees as the top reasons, the voters of Los 
Angeles County successfully rejected Wal-Mart’s attempts to construct a Supercenter in a 
Los Angeles suburb in the spring of 2005 (Joyce, 2005). Further, in anticipation of Wal-  3
Mart’s entry, conventional supermarkets attempt to reduce union wages and benefits in 
regions of California targeted for proposed Supercenters (Zwiebach, 2004). 
While Wal-Mart has been a prominent and regular topic in the popular press, the 
literature on Wal-Mart, and more specifically on Supercenters and their effects on the 
food industry, is relatively scarce. One reason for the lack of empirical evidence on the 
effect of Supercenters is the absence of a data source; Wal-Mart does not participate in 
any of the public data collection services.  
Among the few studies examining Supercenters, Franklin (2001) found no significant 
impact of Supercenters on supermarket concentration in metropolitan areas. It is 
important to note however that the supermarket industry was already concentrated at the 
time of research due to the large wave of mergers and acquisitions in the mid to late 
1990’s.
2 According to Franklin (2001), the market share achieved by Wal-Mart 
Supercenters is inversely proportional to the income of local consumers amongst 
metropolitan areas. Moreover, he observed that Supercenters are more likely to enter low-
income areas, which is consistent with the literature on conventional Wal-Mart stores. 
There is no evidence in the literature that Supercenters are responsible for 
supermarkets’ closing. However, Capps and Griffin (1998) determined that Wal-Mart 
Supercenters were directly responsible for a 21% reduction in sales for a regional chain 
of supermarkets in the Dallas/Fort Worth area of Texas. The combined effect of 
Supercenters and Wal-Mart’s wholesale outlet, Sam’s Club Stores, on supermarkets 
                                                 
2 Preliminary concentration figures from the 2002 U.S. Economic Census (NAICS code 445110) indicate 
that the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) was 32.5 percent, up from 20.8 percent in 1997. Note that this 
national measure of concentration understates the level of concentration in the industry, which is local in 
nature.    4
resulted in a loss of $15 to $17 billion in sales from supermarkets nationwide in 2001 
(USA Today as cited by Jones, 2004). 
Wal-Mart Supercenters follow a different pricing strategy than most supermarkets. 
All Wal-Mart stores price their products using Everyday Low Pricing (EDLP), meaning 
that all products are marked up by the same percentage regardless the price at which they 
were acquired (Vance and Scott, 1994). Sales, promotions, and advertising play a minor 
role in the practice of EDLP. Most supermarkets, by contrast, employ High-Low Pricing 
(HLP), whereby most products are given a high markup. However, a certain percentage 
of goods, changing on a regular basis, are discounted. In many cases promotional items 
are sold at a loss to the store (Jones, 2004). In the face of competition with conventional 
supermarkets, the EDLP strategy is profitable for Supercenters because it creates a stark 
price contrast with the higher priced supermarkets. Jones used a game theoretical 
approach to show that supermarkets would have higher sales if they all employed EDLP 
when competing with discount stores, but the incentive for a supermarket to deviate and 
employ HLP in order to attract customers with unique sale prices is very strong.  
According to a 2002 UBS Warburg study, Wal-Mart Supercenters’ prices are on 
average 14% lower than competing supermarkets (Bianco and Zellner, 2003). The 
question of how Wal-Mart’s prices affect the prices at conventional supermarkets has 
gone largely unanswered in the literature. 
An exception is the work of Woo, Huang, Epperson, and Cude (2002), who 
monitored prices at conventional supermarkets before and after the entry of a Wal-Mart 
Supercenter in the low-income area surrounding Athens, Georgia. They found that 
supermarkets lowered their prices significantly prior to the Supercenter’s entry, but that   5
prices gradually rose back to their original levels following the entry. The only 
supermarkets showing lasting effects from the Supercenter entry were those with the 
highest prices at the beginning of the study. 
The objective of this study is to examine the impact of Wal-Mart Supercenters on 
conventional stores’ prices in three New England states (Connecticut, Massachusetts, and 
Rhode Island). We also examine how Wal-Mart Supercenters set their grocery prices in 
relation to conventional supermarkets. For these purposes, we use a unique data set on the 
price of a basket of goods sold in 18 stores comprising both Supercenters and 
supermarkets, 
In addition to the unique data set, this article contributes to the literature and differs 
from prior studies in many respects. The majority of the existing empirical work on Wal-
Mart has been conducted in rural areas southern and the midwestern states of the United 
States, where Wal-Mart originated and where it is still prominent among chain retailers 
(e.g., McGee and Rubach, 1996; Stone, 1997; Capps and Griffin, 1998; Hicks and 
Wilburn, 2001; Woo, Huang, Epperson, and Cude, 2001). The New England region is 
both wealthier and more densely populated than the regions generally sampled for Wal-
Mart studies.
3 The six Supercenters examined in this article are located in areas where 
median household income ranges between $30,115 and $60,449. There are 
neighborhoods of households with annual incomes greater than $60,000 within five miles 
of most of the Supercenters. Given that Wal-Mart achieves the greatest profits and market 
share in rural regions of low income (McGee and Rubach, 1997; Franklin, 2001), the 
                                                 
3 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the median household income for the United States in 2003 was 
$43,527, whereas it was $55,004 for Connecticut, $52,084 for Massachusetts, and $42,205 for Rhode 
Island.   6
demographic distinction marked by the New England location will shed light on the 
impact of Wal-Mart stores in a more affluent region.  
In addition to examining the impact of Supercenters in a more affluent region, we 
also include in the market basket examined for this study both national brand and private 
label goods. Supermarkets and Supercenters alike offer lines of both national brand and 
private label goods. National brand goods are obtained from national distributors and 
manufacturers while private labels are acquired through a form of vertical integration 
(Mills, 1995). An example of this distinction is seen between Coca-Cola and Stop n’ 
Shop brand cola. 
The benefits of including both types of goods in our research are two fold. First, it 
enables us to provide a better understanding on the nature of the competition between 
Supercenters and supermarkets given that supermarkets have greater control over private 
label than national brand prices (Ward, Shimshack, Perloff, and Harris, 2002). Moreover, 
Wal-Mart’s effect on the national brand/private label price margin can be determined for 
the affected supermarkets.
4 Second, given that private labels are most popular among 
consumers of low income classes (Dhar and Hoch, 1997), whereas national brands are 
favored by affluent consumers, we are able to comment on the effect of Supercenters on 
prices paid by consumers of different levels of income. In order to get the clearest picture 
of Wal-Mart’s effect on grocery prices and to better understand how supermarkets choose 
to compete with Wal-Mart, both the national brand and private label market baskets are 
                                                 
4 The margin between branded and unbranded goods has been dynamic over the past decade due to factors 
such as the sharp increase in supermarket concentration and the drive by supermarkets to produce higher 
quality private label products (Ward, Shimshack, Perloff, and Harris, 2003). The main determinants of the 
national brand/private label margin are supermarket concentration (Wills and Mueller, 1989), advertising 
intensity (Connor and Peterson, 1992), and private label sales as a percentage of total sales for any given 
good (Mills, 1995). Bergès-Sennou, Bontems, and Réquillart (2004) provide a review of the literature on 
private label and national brand goods as well as the incentives for retailers to offer private labels.   7
composed of goods from the six major departments found in a supermarket.
5  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
data and how they were acquired for the purposes of this study. This is followed by a 
description of the empirical model as well as theoretical predictions based on the existing 
literature. Empirical results and discussion follow and we conclude with suggestions for 
future research.  
II. The Data 
 
Because Wal-Mart does not participate in any public data collection service, it was 
necessary to gather primary price data. The data were gathered from 18 stores throughout 
the states of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. The selection of the 18 stores 
was made by the following criteria: six of the stores are Wal-Mart Supercenters. Another 
six represent the largest supermarket, in terms of floor size, found within five miles of 
each of the Supercenters. These supermarkets are defined as “competing” supermarkets 
for the purpose of this study. According to Cotterill (1986), consumers rarely travel more 
then five miles from their homes to shop for groceries. Finally, for each supermarket 
competing with a Supercenter, another New England supermarket located further away 
was chosen.  Using data from the 2000 Census as well as the 2004 Trade Dimensions 
Retail Data Directory, stores were selected on the basis of their similarity with the six 
competing supermarkets in terms parent company, size, market conditions, and 
demographics. Those final six stores are used as “comparison” stores to the six 
supermarkets competing with Wal-Mart Supercenters. Appendix A details the location of 
all 18 stores as well as the bases for selection of the comparison stores. 
                                                 
5 According to Cotterill (1999a), the six departments with the largest shares of supermarket sales are the 
grocery, dairy, frozen food, health and beauty aids (HBA), meat, and produce departments.   8
The 54 products sampled in this study were selected from a larger list compiled by 
Cotterill (1999a) and span the six major supermarket departments: grocery, dairy, frozen 
food, health and beauty aids (HBAs), meat, and produce. The products were selected in 
proportion to departmental shares of sales calculated by Cotterill (1999a) to represent a 
typical consumer’s market basket. This explains, for example, why more goods were 
sampled from the grocery department than from the dairy department. In every 
department the selection of products was divided evenly between national brand and 
private label goods, with the exception of the produce department, in which only national 
brand goods were available. Taking into account the fact that private label products are 
not identical among different supermarket chains, we used data from Consumer Reports 
to select products that do not vary a lot in quality among manufacturers. Quality variation 
among private label products is a potential source of price variation, because stores with 
higher quality private labels have higher private label prices (Bergès-Sennou, Bontems, 
and Réquillart, 2003). The data from Consumer Reports are intended to control for 
changes in price resulting from quality variation among different lines of private label 
products. A list of the products and their average price across the 18 stores can be found 
in Appendix B. 
The prices were recorded directly off the shelves of the 18 stores within a span of 
three weeks in October 2004. Gathering the data within one calendar month minimizes 
the presence of time-series trends. Woo, Huang, Epperson, and Cude (2001), who used 
time series price analyses, showed food markups to shift on a monthly basis in response 
to market conditions. Only the non-promotional prices were recorded when a sampled   9
product was on promotion. Figure 1 reports the average price of the entire market basket 
at each of the store categories.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Examining the prices of the goods on an aggregate basis, the order from least 
expensive to most expensive is Wal-Mart Supercenters, competing supermarkets, and 
comparison supermarkets. For both national brand and private label goods, the most 
pronounced average price difference is between the Wal-Mart Supercenters and their 
nearby competitors. Regarding the price difference between supermarkets that compete 
with Wal-Mart and those that do not, competing supermarkets charge an average of $6.90 
less for the entire basket of national brand goods. For the private label goods the 
difference is $4.26. 
III. The Model 
Empirically, the test focuses on estimating the price differences between the different 
types of stores (Supercenters, competing and comparison supermarkets) as well as across 
the different supermarket departments and brands, while controlling for store 
characteristics, towns’ demographics and market conditions. We pooled price data from 
competing supermarkets,  comparison supermarkets, and the six Supercenters. The value 
of a basket of good of brand i (i=national brand (N), private label (P)) consisting of 
products in department j ( j=dairy, frozen food, health and beauty aids (HBA), meat, 
produce, grocery) at store k can be expressed as: 
(1) V ijk= β i0+ β i1 DAIRY + β i2 FROZEN + β i3 HBA +β i4 MEAT + β i5 PRODUCE + 
  β i6 COMPETE + β i7 COMPARE + β i8 COMPETEDAIRY + 
  β i9 COMPETEFROZ + β i10 COMPETEHBA +β i11 COMPETEMEAT + 
  β i12 COMPETEPROD+ β i13 COMPDAIRY +β i14 COMPFROZ+ 
  β i15 COMPHBA + β i16 COMPMEAT+ β i17 COMPPROD + δiXk +ui 
   10
where DAIRY, FROZEN, HBA, MEAT, and PRODUCE are binary variables intended to 
capture price variations resulting from different price differences across departments. For 
example, DAIRY takes the value of one if the basket is composed of goods that are part of 
the dairy department and zero otherwise. The reference category is the grocery 
department. COMPETE and COMPARE are binary variables taking the value of one if 
the market basket belongs to a competing or comparison supermarket respectively and 
zero otherwise. The reference category is Wal-Mart Supercenter. These variables are also 
interacted with the departmental dummies (e.g., COMPETEDAIRY, COMPETEFROZ, 
etc.). 
Xk is a vector of variables describing store characteristics, towns’ demographics, and 
market conditions associated to store k. The variables included in this vector are 
described next. RICH is a binary variable equal to one if the city or town in which the 
department was found had a median household income greater than $45,725, i.e., within 
the upper half of the data set.
6 Given that consumers become less price sensitive as 
income increases (Hoch, Kim, Montgomery, and Rossi, 1995) and that consumers with 
annual incomes greater than $60,000 are likely to choose conventional supermarkets over 
discount or warehouse stores (Palma, Emerson, and House, 2003), RICH is expected to 
be positive for both brands of goods. Data on median household incomes were obtained 
from the 2000 census.  
POPDENSITY is the population density, measured as the population of the city or 
town where the store is located, divided by the land area in square miles. The results of 
Palma, Emerson, and House (2003) show that proximity is an important determinant of 
                                                 
6 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the median household income for the United States was $43,527 in 
2003, thus the upper portion of the dataset represents towns and cities that are wealthier relative to the U.S. 
average.   11
decisions made by consumers and retailers may have an incentive to compete when 
consumers are able to travel among stores easily. The coefficient on this variable is 
expected to be negative. Data on population and land areas were obtained from the 2000 
census. 
DTLC is the distance to the largest competitor within five miles. All data on store size 
and location were obtained from Trade Dimensions, a retail data directory. This variable 
is similar in nature to POPDENSITY and is expected to be positive for both brands. In 
other words, as the distance from the largest competitor increases, price competition is 
expected to decrease and thus the prices to rise. Capps and Griffin (1998) found that 
population density has greater explanatory power in price regression than simply 
population size. 
The variable SSIZE represents the size of the store measured in square feet. Large 
supermarkets generally offer lower prices than smaller supermarkets (Binkley and 
Connor, 1996; MacDonald and Nelson, 1991). Additionally, Supercenters are the largest 
stores sampled in this study and they are expected to have the lowest prices due to the 
EDLP policy of Wal-Mart. Therefore, the coefficient on SSIZE is expected to be negative 
for both brands.  
CONCENTRATED is a binary variable equal to one if the store is in a market with 
less than four competing stores. The market, for the purposes of this study, is defined by 
five-mile radius surrounding the largest store sampled in a city or town. Except for the 
studies of Kaufman and Handy (1989) and Newmark (1990), which have been criticized 
for their methodology, prior literature shows that there is a positive relationship between 
concentration and food prices (Hall, Schmitz, and Cothern, 1979; Lamn, 1981; Cotterill,   12
1986; Binkley and Connor, 1998; Cotterill, 1999b; Yu and Connor, 2002). Thus, we 
expect that the coefficient on this variable will have a positive sign.
7  
BH is the percentage of Blacks and Hispanics living in the town of interest at the time 
of the 2000 census. According to Hoch, Kim, Montgomery, and Rossi (1995) Blacks and 
hispanics are more sensitive to grocery prices. Therefore, the effect of this variable on 
price is expected to be positive. Equation (1) is estimated for each brand i, i.e., for 
national brands and private labels, for ease of interpretation and readability. However, 
there are no private label produce goods, thus there are no dummies or interaction terms 
related to produce goods in the private label equation, i.e., the coefficients βP5, βP12, and 
βP17 are zero.  
By construction, βi0 is the average value of a market basket composed of goods of 
brand i from the grocery department at Wal-Mart Supercenters located in towns or cities 
with median household income of less than $45,725 and with four or more competing 
stores. Thus, βi6 is the average increment to this price charged for buying at a competing 
store and βi7 is the average increment for buying at a comparison store. If Wal-Mart 
Supercenters cause a decrease in prices at conventional supermarkets as found by Woo, 
Huang, Epperson, and Cude (2001) in Athens, GA, and Wal-Mart’s food prices are lower 
than those of their competitors (Bianco and Zellner, 2004), than the coefficients on the 
variables  COMPETE and COMPARE should be positive and the coefficient for 
COMPARE should be higher in magnitude than the one for compete. That is, the prices at 
                                                 
7 Income and concentration are qualitative, rather than quantitative, due to their lack of statistical 
significance as quantitative predictors. A prior study  in food retailing (Palma, Emerson, and House,  2003) 
found that a significant change in consumers’ decisions occurs at a particular income threshold. Likewise, 
Bresnahan (1991) found that prices typically cease to change significantly after the entry of the 3
rd 
competing firm.   13
Wal-Mart Supercenters should be lower than those at competing stores, which in turn 
should be lower than those at comparison stores. 
The comparison stores are expected to have higher prices in the other departments as 
well, but the coefficients must be properly mapped to calculate the average expected 
values of market baskets by department and store category. Tables 1 and 2 report the 
mapping of coefficients for the national brand and private label models. 
[Tables 1 and 2 here] 
 
Table 3 summarizes the variables used in the models and their predicted signs. The 
only prediction regarding the interaction terms is that those involving the dummy 
COMPARE have greater coefficients than those involving COMPETE. The signs of the 
effects cannot be predicted. 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Equation (1) was estimated using the dependent variable Vijk constructed as an index 
of the weighted average price of the goods in the market basket by department. Prior 
authors have constructed price indexes for an entire basket (Cotterill, 1986; Macdonald 
and Nelson, 1991; Cotterill, 1999a; Woo, Huang, Epperson, and Cude, 2001; Yu and 
Connor, 2002) or use relative prices of products as a dependent variable (Wills and 
Mueller, 1989). However, Binkley and Connor (1998) have shown that fresh goods (fresh 
red meats, milk, and produce) are priced differently than packaged goods (products in the 
“dry grocery” and “health and beauty” departments). Thus, we chose to construct 
departmental price indexes to examine whether the price response to the presence of a 
Wal-Mart Supercenter differs by department. The indexes by department, store type, and 
brand, were constructed by weighting prices within a market basket by estimated annual 
average consumer expenditure on each good. Doing so allows for proper accounting of   14
the different nature of the market baskets as well as respects the patterns of consumption 
in the United States.  























where Vijk is the weighted price index for the market basket composed of goods of brand i 
in department j of store k. It is constructed as the weighted average price of the Mj goods 
of brand i in department j of store k, divided by the same thing for store 1 (the reference 
store) and multiplied by 100. Wmj is the weight assigned to good m in department j and 
Pmijk is the price of good m of brand i in department j at store k. The weights for the 















where  mj P is the average price of good m in department j across all 18 stores sampled for 
this study and Cmj  is the estimated per capita annual consumption of good m  in 
department j in the United States in the year 2003 as measured by the Economic Research 
Service of the USDA.
8 Thus, the weight Wmj is the expenditure on good m, which is part 
of the market basket of department j, relative to the total expenditure on all goods 
sampled in department j. The reference store is Wal-Mart Supercenter in Raynham, MA, 
                                                 
8 Some products, such as pasta sauce and chocolate chip cookies, were too specific in nature and were not 
included in the ERS database. In those cases, data for broader product categories, such as tomatoes for 
processing and confectionary chocolate, were used. Other products, particularly those of the HBA 
department, were not available at all from the ERS. Approximate values of annual consumption obtained 
from the manufacturers’ websites for these products were used.   15
for the national brand indexes and Wal-Mart Supercenter in Jewett City, CT, for the 
private label indexes.  These stores were chosen because across departments they have 
the lowest average prices. Tables 4 and 5 provide descriptive statistics for the price 
indexes, by department, store type, and brand. 
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 here] 
Tables 4 and 5 show that across all departments Wal-Mart Supercenters have on 
average the lowest price index, followed by competing supermarkets and finally 
comparison supermarkets. The only exception to this pattern is the national brand meat 
department, where the competing supermarkets have a slightly higher price index on 
average. 
The CV statistics also reveal another trend in the data.
9 For all of the departments, 
except for national brand frozen foods, the Supercenters exhibit the lowest relative 
variability in the price indexes. This is expected, given that Wal-Mart’s EDLP pricing 
strategy is defined by applying the same markup to all products regardless of the price at 
which they were acquired (Vance and Scott, 1994). Moreover, the competing stores have 
the greatest relative variability in price indexes except for only two departments-national 
brand meat and private label groceries. This finding suggests that the presence of Wal-
Mart Supercenters results in greater price variability among conventional competitors. 
Marion, Heimforth, and Bailey (1993) determined that large warehouse and discount 
stores would result in a reduction in the ability of conventional supermarkets to 
coordinate pricing strategies. Additionally, the empirical work of Khanna and Tice 
(2000) found that depending on various store characteristics, such as corporate debt, 
                                                 
9 The coefficient of variation, also known as the relative variability, is calculated by dividing the standard 
deviation by the mean.   16
internal ownership, store size, and chain size, different stores choose to compete with 
Wal-Mart through different means. Stores choose to compete in price, in quality or 
service, or they choose not to change the manner in which they do business. 
The ideal scenario for weighting prices would include data on store level expenditure 
patterns. Given the lack of publicly available data, the above calculation of these price 
indexes implies a number of assumptions. The ERS data is calculated on a national basis 
and thus these indexes assume that New England consumption patterns follow those of 
the United States as a whole. Additionally, these indexes assume that consumers shop 
equally at Supercenters, conventional competing and comparison supermarkets, and that 
the consumption pattern is the same across store type. Finally, the same consumption data 
are used for both national brand and private label goods, implying that consumers 
purchase national brands and private labels in equal amounts. This is a strong assumption 
based on previous findings that national brand goods exceed private labels in both sales 
and total quantity across all product categories (Raju and Dhar, 1991; Ward, Shimshack, 
Perloff, and Harris, 2002). In future work, other weighting schemes will be explored to 
examine the robustness of the results. Table 6 reports the descriptive statistics for the 
quantitative variables used in the regression models, pooled across all departments and 
store categories. The higher average value for the private label price indexes does not 
imply that the private label goods have higher average prices. This result reflects the fact 
that the private label indexes were standardized to lower values than the national brand 
indexes. 
[Insert table 6 here]   17
The private label indexes have a higher CV than the national brand indexes. This may 
be a reflection of the heterogeneity of private label products across chains and the pricing 
strategies associated with them. This finding also supports the notion that stores have, on 
average, a greater influence on private label prices than on national brand prices (Bergès-
Sennou, Bontems, and Réquillart, 2004). 
IV. Results and Discussion 
 
Equation (1) was estimated for market baskets composed of national brands and market 
baskets composed of private labels using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Each 
equation was also estimated with the dependent variable expressed as an index and in 
absolute value. The results are shown in table 7. All four models have high explanatory 
power, as seen by the model F-statistics and the adjusted R
2 values. Diagnostic tests 
revealed no multicollinearity or heteroskedastic errors.
10,11 
[Insert table 7] 
The coefficients in the demographic and market condition variables all have their 
expected signs, with the exception of BH for national brand price indexes, which is not 
statistically significant. In terms of statistical significance, the demographic and market 
condition variables perform better for private label products than for the national brand 
products. All of the demographic and market condition variables are statistically 
significant in the private label model, while only income (RICH), store size (SSIZE) and 
concentration (CONCENTRATED) are significant for national brand goods. This pattern 
                                                 
10 The variance inflation factors (VIFS) for each of the independent variables were below the collinear 
benchmark of 10. 
11 White’s test was performed with homoskedasticity as the null hypothesis. For all four models we failed 
to reject the null hypothesis.   18
supports the findings that supermarkets have greater control over private label prices than 
over the national brand prices, which are largely set by manufacturers (Mills, 1995).  
The departmental dummy variables are all statistically insignificant. This suggests 
that Wal-Mart Supercenters do not set prices in the departments included in the models 
different from the grocery department. This finding is supported by both the research on 
Wal-Mart’s policy of applying the same price markups to all of its products (Vance and 
Scott, 1994) and the CV pattern of the data, which showed very little variation in prices 
among all Supercenter locations and all departments. 
The coefficients on COMPETE and COMPARE  are both positive and highly 
significant, meaning that both the competing and comparison stores set prices for 
products in the grocery department higher than do the Wal-Mart Supercenters. Recalling 
the mapping techniques presented in tables 1 and 2, the average expected values for the 
competing and comparison grocery department price indexes are given by βN0+βN6 and 
βN0+βN7 respectively for national brand products and βP0+βP6 and βP0+βP7 respectively 
for private label products. Therefore, the coefficients for COMPETE and COMPARE are 
the percentages by which the conventional store prices, on average, exceed Supercenter 
prices in the grocery department. For national brand goods, the competing stores price 
their goods 20.43% higher than Supercenters. The comparison stores’ prices are 38.55% 
higher than Supercenters on average. Similarly, the prices of private label goods at 
competing stores are 21.30% higher than at Supercenters and they are 35.11% higher at 
comparison stores than at Supercenters. 
The coefficients on COMPARE is smaller than the coefficients on COMPETE in both 
regression, which suggests that the prices of goods in the grocery department are lower,   19
on average in competing stores than comparison stores, holding all else constant. This 
indicates that the presence of Wal-Mart Supercenters decreases grocery prices. However, 
an F-test must be performed to assess the statistical significance of these differences for 
each department. We compute this test for all departments later on in this section. 
Some of the interaction terms between the comparison store type and departments are 
statistically significant. The interaction terms are interpreted as differences in margins 
between store types. For example, in the national brand regression, the coefficient for 
COMPAREMEAT reveals that the margin between grocery price indexes and meat prices 
indexes for comparison stores is 24.9 index points smaller, on average, than the margin 
between grocery indexes and meat indexes for Supercenters. The coefficients for 
COMPAREDAIRY and COMPAREHBA are also statistically significant in the national 
brand model. Binkley and Connor (1998) found that conventional supermarkets price 
their perishables, such as meat and dairy products, differently from dry goods, which 
supports this finding. The fact that the HBA department is the only non-food department 
may account for the difference in pricing between comparison stores and Supercenters 
among HBA products. 
COMPAREMEAT is the only significant interaction term in the private label model. 
In other words, it is only for the meat department that we find a statistically significant 
difference between Supercenters and conventional supermarkets in the pricing of goods 
by department, relative to the grocery department.  The smaller number of significant 
interaction terms in the private label model, relative to the national brand model, suggests 
that the pricing among store categories is more constant for private label goods. The 
pricing strategy of the manufacturers and distributors that supply national brand goods to   20
supermarkets may be responsible for the greater number of differences among national 
brand departments for comparison supermarkets.  
The interaction terms involving competing stores are insignificant in both models. 
This finding shows that the differences among departmental price indexes for competing 
supermarkets are not statistically different from the differences among departmental price 
indexes for Supercenters. Therefore, the results show that while comparison stores do not 
price all of their departments similarly, the competing stores do. 
Using the mapping technique demonstrated in tables 1 and 2, tables 8 and 9 report the 
expected price index for each department and store type, holding all demographics and 
market conditions constant. Column (6) in the tables reports the estimated difference in 
the price indexes for the comparison supermarkets and those of the competing 
supermarkets. This estimated difference in supermarket prices is interpreted as the impact 
of Wal-Mart Supercenters on prices at conventional supermarkets. F-tests were 
performed to test for the statistical significance of Wal-Mart’s estimated impact. For 
example, the test of significance for the impact of Wal-Mart on national brand dairy 
products had the null hypothesis H0: βN6+βN8 = βN7+βN13. 
[Insert tables 8 and 9 here] 
The estimated Wal-Mart effect is negative for all departments, except for the meat 
department, for both national brand and private labels. Supercenters result in decreased 
prices at nearby supermarkets, which is in accordance with our predictions. The 
statistically significant effects range from a 7% (national brand frozen food) to 16% 
(national brand dairy) decrease in price on average. While the effect of Supercenters is 
positive for the meat department, it is not statistically significant.   21
Looking at the estimated impact of Wal-Mart Supercenters on prices, we see that 
Supercenters have a significant effect on the grocery, dairy, and frozen food departments 
for both national brand and private label goods. Supercenters have no significant effect 
on the HBA, meat, and produce departments. For both brands, the greatest estimated 
impact of Supercenters is found in the dairy department, with competing price indexes 
being 15.83% lower on average for national brand goods and 11.11% lower on average 
for private label goods, relative to comparison stores. For national brand and private 
label, the estimated reduction in price indexes for grocery products is 13.10% and 
10.20% respectively and 6.99% and 8.01% respectively for frozen food products. Woo, 
Huang, Epperson and Cude (2001) found that dairy was affected more strongly than most 
other departments by the entry of a Supercenter, which coincides with our results. 
However, our finding that Supercenters have no effect on meat prices is in contrast to 
their study. 
Tables 8 and 9 show that for all departments and for both brand types, Wal-Mart 
Supercenters set prices significantly lower than both competing supermarkets and 
comparison supermarkets. Column (5) of the tables shows how the price indexes at 
Supercenters compare to those at supermarkets that do not compete directly with Wal-
Mart.  
For national brand goods, the greatest price index differences between Supercenters 
and comparison conventional stores are in the dairy, frozen food, and grocery 
departments on average. The smallest margin between Supercenters and conventional 
supermarkets is in the meat department. The margin of difference between Supercenter   22
prices and conventional stores ranges between 11% lower than produce at competing 
stores to 35% lower than dairy products at comparison stores. 
For private label goods, the margin between Supercenters and conventional stores is 
high for all departments except for, again, the meat department. The price difference 
between Supercenters and conventional stores ranges from 13.23% lower for dairy 
products at competing stores to 25.94% lower for grocery products at comparison stores. 
The greatest price differences between Supercenters and conventional stores for private 
label goods are found in the grocery and HBA departments. 
Table 10 lists departmental shares of sales as determined by (1999a). Using these 
values, we calculated the overall effect of Wal-Mart Supercenters on prices at 
conventional supermarkets. For both models, the effect was calculated using only 
statistically significant effects. The results are shown in table 11. 
[Insert table 10 and 11here] 
 
Wal-Mart Supercenters result in a statistically significant 7.79% overall reduction in 
price indexes for national brand goods and a 6.38% reduction in private label price 
indexes. Therefore the presence of Wal-Mart Supercenters results in a decrease in the 
national brand/private label margin in competing supermarkets. This effect may be due to 
the fact that Wal-Mart Supercenters practice the EDLP strategy. This pricing has been 
found to increase private label proliferation within all supermarket product categories 
(Dhar and Hoch, 1997). Prior work on the national brand/private label margin has found 
that as private label proliferation increases, the private label prices increase relative to 
national brand prices, thereby narrowing the margin between brands (Mills, 1995; Ward, 
Shimshack, Perloff and Harris, 2002).    23
This study also seeks to determine the relationship between Supercenter and 
conventional supermarket prices. Using the departmental shares of sales as weights, we 
calculated the overall price difference between Wal-Mart Supercenters and both 
competing and comparison supermarkets. The results are compiled in table 12.  
[Insert table 12 here] 
 
The weighted mean of the price indexes at Wal-Mart Supercenters is significantly 
lower than the equivalent measure at both types of conventional supermarkets and for 
both brands. The percentage difference between conventional store prices and 
Supercenter prices ranges from 14.37% for private label products at competing stores to 
25.19% for national brand comparison stores. Both types of conventional supermarkets 
set their private label prices, on average, closer to the prices of Wal-Mart Supercenters.   
The Effect of Wal-Mart Supercenters on Consumers 
 
Before the widespread expansion of Wal-Mart Supercenters across the United States, 
Marion, Heimforth, and Bailey (1993) predicted that depot stores would greatly reduce 
the prices paid by consumers in two ways. Depot stores, more commonly referred to in 
the literature as warehouse stores, are minimal service, low-cost grocery retailing outlets. 
According to the authors, warehouse stores would be able to offer grocery products at 
prices substantially lower than those found at incumbent supermarkets. Additionally, the 
authors predicted that supermarkets would likely reduce their prices in order to compete 
with warehouse stores. MacDonald and Nelson (1991) determined that supermarkets in 
cities without warehouse stores have grocery prices that are 4.5% higher, on average, 
than prices found at supermarkets within five miles of warehouse stores. Cotterill (1999b) 
found that supermarkets competing with warehouse stores price their groceries 2.66%   24
lower, on average, than supermarkets not competing with warehouse stores. He also 
determined that warehouse store prices are on average 8.8% lower than supermarket 
prices. 
Our findings demonstrate both a greater impact on conventional supermarket prices 
and a greater margin between Supercenters and supermarket prices in New England. 
After holding constant the most important factors in determining supermarket prices as 
discussed by a wide survey of the literature: concentration, population density, and the 
quality of the goods sampled, we found that Supercenters result in a 7.79% overall price 
decrease for national brand goods. The equivalent price decrease for private label goods 
is 6.38%. The warehouse store category includes wholesale outlets, which require club 
memberships, as well as warehouse efforts by conventional grocery chains such as A&P 
and hyperstores such Wal-Mart Supercenters, which combine food and nonfood stores 
under the same roof (Marion, Heimforth, and Bailey, 1993). While the aforementioned 
studies examined the impact of the entire category of warehouse stores, our work focuses 
on a single variety of warehouse store.  Our findings show that the presence of Wal-Mart 
Supercenters yields a greater reduction in food prices at conventional supermarkets than 
does the presence of other varieties of warehouse stores. Given that no membership is 
required to shop at Supercenters, the greater reduction in prices than found in other 
studies makes sense. Membership would have for effect to limit the impact of a 
warehouse on its supermarket competitors.  
The consumer who is able to choose between shopping at supermarkets within five 
miles of a Supercenter or supermarkets more than five miles from the nearest Supercenter 
will save money by choosing the supermarket in competition with a Supercenter. This is   25
particularly true if the consumer is shopping in the grocery, dairy, and frozen food 
departments, which together comprise over 61% of the purchases made by consumers 
(Cotterill 1999a). 
Far greater than the price margin between competing and comparison stores as a 
result of the presence of a Supercenter is the margin between the Supercenters themselves 
and conventional food retailers. Holding everything constant, Supercenters’ prices are 
nearly 17% less than the prices of their nearby competitors for national brand goods and 
more than 14% less for private label goods. When compared to supermarkets 
geographically distant, this margin grows even wider. While there are many factors that 
consumers consider when choosing a supermarket (Palma, Emerson, and House, 2003), 
price sensitive consumers have a significant incentive to choose Wal-Mart Supercenters 
over conventional stores. 
The Effect of Wal-Mart Supercenters on Competitors 
The CV pattern in the price indexes suggests that Wal-Mart results in greater price 
variation among supermarkets with which it competes. Due to the cross-sectional nature 
of the data it is not possible to know with certainty if Supercenters reduce the ability of 
supermarkets to coordinate prices and promotional activities, as suggested by Marion, 
Heimforth, and Bailey (1993). However, the increased price index variation among 
competing supermarkets supports the notion that not all incumbent stores choose the 
same strategy in competition with Wal-Mart. Cotterill (1999b) determined that some 
supermarkets compete with large warehouse and discount stores by differentiating their 
product line rather than lowering prices, which is a possible explanation for increased 
price index variation.    26
Additionally, several of the supermarkets sampled for this study that were competing 
with Supercenters were recently renovated, with features such as gasoline stations, coffee 
shops, and bookstores. The Stop n’ Shop supermarkets competing with Supercenters 
advertised “Everyday Low Prices” despite the fact that the chain still utilizes HLP (Jones, 
2004). These observations support the findings of Khanna and Tice (2000), stating that 
some incumbent stores choose to compete with Wal-Mart by improving service, image, 
or variety rather than attempting to lower prices to match the discount giant. If 
conventional supermarkets chose to compete with Supercenters solely in price, we would 
expect the prices at competing stores to exhibit a CV pattern that more closely resembles 
that of the comparison stores. Moreover, the regression results would show a greater 
impact of the Supercenters on prices at conventional supermarkets. 
Mills (1995) argues that a major reason supermarkets offer private labels is because 
of their profitability. Supermarkets obtain higher markups on private labels than on 
national brand goods, even though they are sold at lower prices than national brands. 
Given that we found a 7.79% percentage decrease in national brand prices and a 6.38% 
decrease in private label prices at competing supermarkets, it follows that supermarkets 
competing with Wal-Mart Supercenters rely on private labels for a greater share of their 
profit than do comparison supermarkets.  
V. Conclusion 
The primary objective of this study was to examine the effect of Wal-Mart Supercenters 
on the prices at conventional supermarkets in New England. This effect was examined 
with regards to the six major supermarket departments as well as both national brand and   27
private label goods. The secondary goals of this study included the examination of Wal-
Mart’s food prices in comparison to conventional supermarket prices. 
This paper provides insight into questions regarding Wal-Mart Supercenters that are 
being asked more and more frequently in the United States as the firm continually 
announces its plans to erect more stores. It also provides several implications for further 
research. 
The primary findings of this study are as follows: 
1) Wal-Mart Supercenters result in a price decrease 7.79% for national brand goods at 
conventional supermarkets competing within a radius of five miles. The corresponding 
decrease in private label goods is 6.38%. Given that national brand goods are more 
expensive, Supercenters result in a decrease in the national brand/private label price 
margin. 
2) Wal-Mart Supercenters result in the greatest price decreases in the grocery and 
dairy departments in conventional stores. There is also a smaller and statistically 
significant effect on frozen food prices. Supercenters have no significant effect on the 
HBA, meat, or produce departments. 
3) Holding constant the market concentration, as measured by the number of large 
competitors within five miles and the distance among competitors, Wal-Mart 
Supercenters price their national brand and private label products significantly lower than 
conventional supermarkets. However, there is a greater difference between supermarkets 
and Supercenters in national brand prices than in private label prices. 
In terms of further research, the observed CV pattern in the data calls for an 
exploration of the strategic efforts in areas other than pricing employed by supermarkets   28
to compete with Wal-Mart Supercenters as well as the effectiveness of each strategy. 
Capps and Griffin (1998) found that Supercenters result in the loss of sales among 
competing supermarkets and this study found significant reductions in prices among 
competitors. These findings do not bode well for U.S. supermarkets operating in areas 
soon to be inhabited by new Supercenters. More research is needed on the short-run and 
long-run price and non-price response of supermarkets to the entry of Wal-Mart 
Supercenters. Such research would enable a better understanding of the profitability and 
viability of the supermarket industry in the face of the rapid proliferation of Wal-Mart 
Supercenters. 
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Appendix A:  The Selection Criteria for the Supermarkets 
 
In this appendix we present the 12 cities and towns visited in order to gather the price 
data, as well as the food retailers within each city. The cities are listed in pairs, with each 
pair consisting of a city containing a Wal-Mart Supercenter and a city geographically 
distant from any Supercenters. Each pair is followed by a brief explanation for the 
choices made. 
  
Pair 1  
A) North Windham CT 
Population: 38,680  
Median Household Income: $30,155
Stores Store  Size
Wal-Mart Supercenter 
474 Boston Rd. 
Months in operation: 84 
55,000 
Super Stop n’ Shop 
1391 Main St. Hwy 32 
41,000 
Other Store not Chosen 
Shaw’s Supermarket  36,000 
B) Vernon-Rockville CT 
Population: 35,771 
Median Household Income: $44,510
Store Store  Size
Super Stop n’ Shop 
10 Pitkin Rd. 
37,000 
Other store not chosen 
Shaw’s Supermarket  60,000 
 
  Vernon-Rockville has a higher population and median household income than 
North Windham/Willimantic in both population and median household income. 
However, the other viable comparison in this case was Manchester, CT, which has higher 
population and median income than does Vernon Rockville as well as five large 
competing supermarkets. The Stop n’ Shop stores were chosen for comparison because 
they are much closer to each other in size than the stores of Shaw’s chain. The Stop n'   34
Shop store in Vernon featured a newly constructed gas station in the parking lot and was 




A) Westerly, RI 
Population: 22,966 
Median Household Income: $44,613 
Stores  Store Size (sq. ft.)
Wal-Mart Supercenter 
258 Post Rd. 
Months in operation: 20 
57,000 
Super Stop n’ Shop 
2 Post Rd. 
47,000 





B) Seekonk, MA 
Population: 13,425 
Median Household Income: $56,364 
Store Store  Size 
Super Stop n’ Shop 
125 Highland Ave. 
51,000 
Other stores not chosen 
Price Rite 




A city or town containing a Super Stop n’ Shop was required to compare with the 
Westerly, RI Super Stop n’ Shop. There was no location in Rhode Island that was 
comparable to Westerly in terms of demographics or the number of competing 
supermarkets. Therefore, we chose the town of Seekonk, which is located just across the 
border of Rhode Island in Massachusetts and has both large and small supermarkets, as 
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Pair 3 
A) Jewett City, CT 
Population: 3,053 
Median Household Income: $45,826 
Stores Store  Size 
Wal-Mart Supercenter 
180 River Rd. 
Months in operation: 45 
63,000 
Better Valu IGA 
99 River Rd. 
22,000 
B) Plainfield, CT 
Population: 14,619 
Median Household Income: $42,851 
Store Store  Size 
Better Valu IGA 
657 Norwich Rd. and Hwy 
12 
15,000 
Other stores not chosen 
Big Y Supermarket  45,000 
 
Because a Better Valu IGA store was necessary for comparison and because 
duplicating cities used for comparison is not ideal, only two options were available. 
Both were problematic. Plainfield is within 10 miles of the Jewett City Supercenter 
and the Better Valu IGA of Voluntown has a geographic monopoly.  Plainfield was 
chosen because like Jewett City, this town has a Better Valu IGA competing with a 
much larger store. Moreover, the Better Valu IGA of Voluntown is only 6,000 square 
feet in size, making it too small to be considered a supermarket. The IGA store in 
Jewett City is considerably larger and newer than the Plainfield store. 
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Pair 4 
A) Ware, MA 
Population: 9,707 
Median Household Income: $36,875 
Stores Store  Size
Wal-Mart Supercenter 
352 Palmer Rd. 
Months in operation: 103 
55,000 
Big Y Supermarket 
140 West St. 
29,000 
B) Stafford Springs, CT 
Population: 11,307 
Median Household Income: $52,699 
Store Store  Size
Big Y Supermarket 
87 W. Stafford Rd. Hwy 190
35,000 
Other store not chosen 
Stafford Food Center  17,000 
 
The town of Belchertown, MA, was the most attractive choice for comparison with 
Ware due to its similar demographics. However, the town does not have a Big Y 
Supermarket and it lies only five miles away from Ware. We settled on Stafford Springs, 
which is fairly similar to Ware in terms of market conditions and population size but 
differs greatly in terms of income. Stafford Springs, Connecticut is located near the 












A) Waterford, CT 
Population: 19, 152 
Median Household Income: $56,047 
Stores Store  Size
Wal-Mart Supercenter 
155 Waterford Pkwy N. 
Months in operation: 20 
66,000 
Super Stop n’ Shop 
117 Boston Post Rd. Hwy 1 
50,000 
Other store not chosen 
Big Y Supermarket  52,000 
B) Fairhaven, MA 
Population: 16,159 
Median Household Income: $41,696 
Store Store  Size
Super Stop n’ Shop 
221 Huttleson Ave. 
60,000 
Other store not chosen 
Shaw’s Supermarket  42,000 
 
Despite the geographic distance of 90 miles between the two cities, Fairhaven appears 
to be the best choice for comparison. Norwich, CT, was considered as an alternate 
location. However, its population doubles that of Waterford and there are too many 
supermarkets in Norwich to make for a reasonable comparison. Fairhaven shares several 
characteristics with Waterford. Both towns have small populations with relatively higher 
median incomes and both are located near the coast. The coastal location may attract 
tourists in addition to residents as customers. Additionally, both are located within 10 
miles of much larger cities. Waterford lies next to New London, CT, while Fairhaven 
borders New Bedford, MA. Neither New London nor New Bedford has a Supercenter. 
The Waterford Stop n' Shop featured a newly constructed Office Depot as a part of the   38




A) Raynham, MA 
Population: 11,739 
Median Household Income: $64,464 
Stores Store  Size
Wal-Mart Supercenter 
36 Paramount Dr. 
Months in operation: 35 
67,000 
Super Stop n’ Shop 
36 New St. Hwy 
67,000 





B) Attleboro, MA 
Population: 42,068 
Median Household Income: $50,807 
Store Store  Size
Stop n’ Shop 
469 Perry and Pleasant St. 
60,000 
Other stores not chosen 
Ro Jack’s (a) 






The population disparity between Raynham and Attleboro makes this comparison 
appear dubious. However, the four large supermarkets of Raynham may also serve 
several surrounding towns such as Prattville that have no supermarkets. The Raynham 
Supercenter probably also draws customers from the neighboring city of Taunton, which 
does not have a Supercenter. Thus, the actual population serviced by the Raynham 
Supercenter is larger than 11,739. While the Shaw’s supermarkets of these areas were 
closer in size than the Stop n’ Shop stores, decided to use the Stop n’ Shops because they 
are closer in size to the Wal-Mart stores and because Stop n’ Shop has largest market   39
share in New England among supermarkets. The work of Woo, Huang, Epperson and 
Cude (2001) showed that stores with the highest markets share changed their prices by 
the greatest margins following the entry of a Wal-Mart Supercenter.  
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Appendix B: The basket of goods selected 
 
Product Department  Average 
Price ($)
Coca-Cola 2-Liter  Grocery  1.38 
PL Cola 2-Liter  Grocery  0.66 
Maxwell House Coffee (13 oz.)  Grocery  2.49 
PL Coffee (13 oz.)  Grocery  2.03 
Bumble Bee Tuna (6 oz.)  Grocery  1.38 
PL Tuna (6 oz.)  Grocery  1.17 
Cheerios (15 oz.)  Grocery  3.15 
PL O-Shaped Cereal (15 oz.)  Grocery  2.02 
Lays Potato Chips (12 oz.)  Grocery  2.66 
PL Potato Chips (12 oz.)  Grocery  1.77 
Kraft Mac n’ Cheese (7.25 oz.)  Grocery  0.97 
PL Mac n’ Cheese (7.25 oz.)  Grocery  0.44 
Prego Pasta Sauce (26 oz.)  Grocery  2.00 
PL Pasta Sauce (26 oz.)  Grocery  1.29 
Jif Creamy Peanut Butter (28 oz.)  Grocery  3.11 
PL Creamy Peanut Butter (28 oz.)  Grocery  2.49 
Del Monte Sliced Peaches (15.25 oz.) Grocery  1.25 
PL Sliced Peaches (15.25 oz.)  Grocery  0.99 
Nabisco Chips Ahoy (16 oz.)  Grocery  3.21 
PL Chocolate Chip Cookies (16 oz.)  Grocery  1.92 
Heinz Ketchup (24 oz.)  Grocery  1.65 
PL Ketchup (24 oz.)  Grocery  1.07 
Bisquik Pancake Mix (40 oz.)  Grocery  2.72 
PL Pancake Mix (40 oz.)  Grocery  1.79 
Hood Milk 1% Milk (gallon)  Dairy  3.51 
PL 1% Milk (gallon)  Dairy  2.94 
Kraft American Singles (16 ct.)  Dairy  2.87 
PL American Singles (16 ct.)  Dairy  2.47 
Land o’ Lakes Butter (1 lb.)  Dairy  4.03 
PL Butter (1 lb.)  Dairy  3.08 
Breyers Vanilla Ice Cream (1/2 gal.)  Frozen Food 4.70 
PL Vanilla Ice Cream (1/2 gal.)  Frozen Food 3.41 
Eggo Homestyle Waffles (10 ct.)  Frozen Food 1.85 
PL Homestyle Waffles (10 ct.)  Frozen Food 1.28 
Birdseye Frozen Broccoli (10 oz.)  Frozen Food 1.14 
PL Frozen Broccoli (10 oz.)  Frozen Food 0.89 
Q-Tips Cotton Swabs (500 ct.)  HBA  3.57 
PL Cotton Swabs (500 ct.)  HBA  2.73 
Dial Anti-Bacterial Soap (3 ct.)  HBA  2.06 
PL Anti-Bacterial Soap (3 ct.)  HBA  1.58 
Edge Shaving Gel (7 oz.)  HBA  2.65 
PL Shaving Gel (7 oz.)  HBA  1.92   41
Appendix B: The basket of goods, continued.    
Purdue Chicken Drumsticks (1 lb.)  Meat  1.62 
PL Chicken Drumsticks (1 lb.)  Meat  1.29 
Perri Italian Sausage (1 lb.)  Meat  3.40 
PL Italian Sausage (1 lb.)  Meat  2.96 
Oscar Meyer Bacon (1 lb.)  Meat  4.98 
PL Bacon (1 lb.)  Meat  3.29 
Red Delicious Apples (1 lb.)  Produce  3.38 
Red Potatoes (1 lb.)  Produce  1.24 
Carrots (1 lb.)  Produce  0.83 
Lettuce Head (head)  Produce  1.30 
Bananas (1 lb.)  Produce  0.55 
Celery (1 lb.)  Produce  1.57 
Note: PL = private label 
 





































     
Figure 1: Average  price of the market basket (54 goods), by store categoryTable 1: Mapping of 
coefficients to obtain the average expected values of market baskets by department and store 
category for national brand goods 
  Wal-Mart  Competing Stores  Comparison Stores 
Grocery  βN0  βN0  + βN6  βN0  + βN7 
Dairy  βN0  + βN1  βN0  + βN1 + βN6 + βN8  βN0  + βN1 + βN7 + βN13 
Frozen  βN0  + βN2  βN0  + βN2 + βN6 + βN9  βN0  + βN2 + βN7 + βN14 
HBA  βN0  + βN3  βN0  + βN3 + βN6 + βN10  βN0  + βN3 + βN7 + βN15 
Meat  βN0  + βN4  βN0  + βN4 + βN6 + βN11  βN0 + βN4 + βN7 + βN16 
Produce  βN0  + βN5  βN0  + βN5 + βN6 + βN12  βN0  + βN5 + βN7 + βN17 
 
Table 2: Mapping of the coefficients to obtain the average expected values of market baskets by 
department and store category for private label goods 
  Wal-Mart  Competing Stores  Comparison Stores 
Grocery  βP0  βP0  + βP6  βP0  + βP7 
Dairy  βP0  + βP1  βP0  + βP1 + βP6 + βP8  βP0  + βP1 + βP7 + βP13 
Frozen  βP0  + βP2  βP0  + βP2 + βP6 + βP9  βP0  + βP2 + βP7 + βP14 
HBA  βP0  + βP3  βP0  + βP3 + βP6 + βP10  βP0  + βP3 + βP7 + βP15 





                      Table 3: Variables used in the models 
 
  Variable Description  Expected  Sign 
DAIRY  Dummy equal to 1 for the dairy department.  - 
FROZEN  Dummy equal to 1 for the frozen food department.  - 
HBA  Dummy equal to 1 for the health and beauty aids department.  - 
MEAT   Dummy equal to 1 for the dairy department.  - 
PRODUCE  Dummy equal to 1 for the dairy department.  - 
COMPETE  Dummy equal to 1 for stores within 5 miles of a Supercenter  + 
COMPARE  Dummy equal to 1 for stores more than 5 miles from a Supercenter  + 
COMPETEDAIRY  Interaction term equal to 1 for competing stores and the dairy department  +/- 
COMPETEFROZ  Interaction term equal to 1 for competing stores and the frozen food department  +/- 
COMPETEHBA  Interaction term equal to 1 for competing stores and the HBA department  +/- 
COMPETEMEAT  Interaction term equal to 1 for competing stores and the meat department  +/- 
COMPETEPROD  Interaction term equal to 1 for competing stores and the produce department  +/- 
COMPDAIRY  Interaction term equal to 1 for comparison stores and the dairy department  > COMPETEDAIRY 
COMPFROZ  Interaction term equal to 1 for comparison stores and the frozen food department  > COMPETEFROZ 
COMPHBA  Interaction term equal to 1 for comparison stores and the HBA department  > COMPETEHBA 
COMPMEAT  Interaction term equal to 1 for comparison stores and the meat department  > COMPETEMEAT 
COMPPROD  Interaction term equal to 1 for comparison stores and the produce department  > COMPETEPROD 
RICH  Dummy variable equal to one if the town of the department has a median 
household  income greater that $45,575. 
+ 
POPDENSITY  The population density, equal to the population of the city or town divided by the 
land area in square miles.  
_ 
DTLC  Distance in miles to the nearest competitor with over 45,000 sq. ft. of floor space.  + 
SSIZE  Store size, in thousands of square feet.  - 
CONCENTRATED  Dummy variable equal to one if there are more than three supermarkets competing 
within a five-mile radius.  
- 
BH  The percentage of black and hispanic people living in the city or town of the 
department.  
-   44
 
Table 4: Summary statistics for national brand price indexes. 
  Grocery Dairy  Frozen 
Food 
HBA Meat Produce
































































Table 5: Summary statistics for private label price indexes 
  Grocery Dairy  Frozen   
Food 
HBA Meat 

























































Table 6: Summary statistics for the quantitative variable of the regression models 
  V SSize  DTLC  PopDens  BH 
Mean                          Model (1) 
                                   Model (2)  














Standard Deviation    Model (1) 
                                   Model (2) 














Coefficient of             Model (1) 
Variation                    Model (2)      
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Table 7: Regression results, standard errors are in parentheses 
(1) (2)   

































































































F 18.58  18.75 
Adjusted R
2  .791 .800 
***: Significant at the .01 level **: Significant at the .05 level  *: Significant at the .10 level   46
Table 8: Expected Price Indexes for Departments, National Brand goods, model (1) 






(4): (1) – (2) 
% difference 
(5):(1) – (3) 
% difference 
(6):(2) – (3) 
% difference 
Grocery  109.11  131.25  151.03  -16.98*** -27.86*** -13.10*** 
Dairy  106.04  137.75  163.65  -23.02*** -35.20*** -15.83*** 
Frozen  Food  114.95  149.04  160.25  -22.87*** -28.27*** -6.99* 
HBA  104.27  124.76  128.14  -16.42*** -18.63*** -2.64 
Meat  106.76  129.93  123.93  -17.83*** -13.86***   4.84 
Produce  105.16  118.58  138.36  -11.32*** -23.99*** -14.29 
***: Difference is significant at the .01 level **: Significant at the .05 level  *: Significant at the .10 level       
 
 
Table 9: Expected Price Indexes for Departments, Private Label goods, model (2) 






(4): (1) – (2) 
% difference 
(6):(1) – (3) 
% difference 
(5):(2) – (3) 
% difference 
Grocery 129.11  156.93  174.76  -17.52***  -25.94***  -10.20** 
Dairy 128.40  147.98  166.47  -13.23***  -22.87***  -11.11** 
Frozen Food  127.57  152.73  166.02  -16.47***  -23.16***  -8.01* 
HBA   128.64  168.90  169.83  -23.84***  -25.54***   -0.55 
Meat 126.61 149.07  144.17  -15.07***  -12.18***    3.40 
***: Difference is significant at the .01 level **: Significant at the .05 level  *: Significant at the .10 level 
 
Table 10: Departmental shares of sales 
Department  Share of Sales 
Grocery 46.07% 
Dairy 7.99% 




                                     Source: Cotterill (1999a) 
 
Table 11: The overall effect of Wal-Mart on supermarket products 
Method (1)  National  Brand 
Price Indexes 
(2) Private Label 
Price Indexes 
Using only statistically significant effects  -7.79%**  -6.38%** 
***: Effect is significant at the .01 level. **: Effect is significant at the .05 level. 
 
 
Table 12: The estimate overall price difference between Supercenters and supermarkets 
Supermarket Category  (1) National Brand Price 
Indexes 
(2) Private Label Price 
Indexes 
Compete -16.92%***  -14.37%*** 
Comparison -25.19%***  -19.36%*** 
***: Difference is significant at the .01 level. 
 
 
 